x.com/perrymetzger/status/2042575263666471057
1 correction found
which require AI to really take advantage of because they are simply too labor-intensive for human beings.
Formal verification does not require AI. It has already been used successfully for years by human-led teams on real systems such as the seL4 kernel, the CompCert compiler, and AWS's s2n TLS library.
Full reasoning
This claim is too strong because it says these techniques require AI to be usable in practice. Credible, pre-LLM examples show the opposite: human researchers and engineers have been using formal verification on production-relevant software for many years.
- The seL4 project states that its kernel has a "formal mathematical proof" and that those machine-checked proofs imply the absence of whole classes of bugs such as buffer overflows and memory leaks. That is a long-running, real-world formal verification effort, not something that depended on modern AI.
- The official CompCert site describes CompCert C as a compiler that is "formally verified, using machine-assisted mathematical proofs" and notes public releases going back to 2008. That directly contradicts the idea that humans could not meaningfully take advantage of formal verification before AI.
- AWS described adding automated formal verification to its s2n TLS library in 2016, explaining that formal verification is typically done by "skilled specialists using mathematical toolsets" and that AWS used a toolchain from Galois to verify parts of s2n. Again, this is a practical use of formal verification years before current AI coding systems.
A narrower claim like "AI may make formal verification cheaper or more scalable" would be arguable. But the posted wording says formal verification techniques require AI because they are too labor-intensive for humans, and the existence of major human-driven formal verification projects shows that is incorrect.
3 sources
- Automated Reasoning and Amazon s2n | AWS Security Blog
Typically, formal verification can be tedious and is performed as research by skilled specialists using mathematical toolsets... we have already formally verified s2n's implementation of HMAC...
- Verification | seL4
seL4 is the most highly-assured operating system kernel... Its uniqueness lies in the formal mathematical proof that it behaves precisely as specified... Functional correctness... implies... the absence of whole classes of common programming errors such as buffer overflows, memory leaks, and other bugs...
- CompCert - The CompCert C compiler
What sets CompCert C apart from any other production compiler, is that it is formally verified, using machine-assisted mathematical proofs, to be exempt from miscompilation issues.