en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Immigration_and_Nationality_Act_of_1965

This date is incorrect. The official Joint Congressional Committee on Inaugural Ceremonies states that Lyndon Baines Johnson became the 36th President of the United States on November 22, 1963, when he was sworn in aboard Air Force One after President Kennedy’s assassination. So January 8, 1964 is not the date he became president.

The article’s category count is wrong. In section 8(a) of Public Law 89-236, Congress rewrote INA §101(a)(27) so that the term "special immigrant" consisted of clauses (A) through (E). Those are five categories in the 1965 act’s text, not six.

This matters because the article is describing the contents of the 1965 law itself, and the enacted statute is the controlling source.

This bullet is misclassified. In Public Law 89-236, the special immigrant definition appears in amended INA §101(a)(27), which lists categories (A) through (E). The orphan language for a child under 14 appears separately in section 8(c), amending INA §101(b)(1)(F) — the definition of "child" for immediate-relative/adoption purposes.

So the bullet is not describing a special-immigrant category created by the 1965 act; it is describing a different provision entirely.

The article is mixing the 1965 act’s preference system with immigration categories created or reorganized later.

In the enacted 1965 law, INA §203(a) gave quota preferences to:

1. unmarried sons and daughters of U.S. citizens;
2. spouses and unmarried sons/daughters of permanent residents;
3. members of the professions or people of exceptional ability in the sciences or arts;
4. married sons and daughters of U.S. citizens;
5. brothers and sisters of U.S. citizens;
6. workers able to perform specified skilled or unskilled labor where a shortage existed; and
7. certain refugees via conditional entry.

The statute does not list investor categories or military-service categories in that 1965 preference system. It also places a minister of religion in the separate special immigrant definition, not in the preference categories.

So this sentence inaccurately describes what the 1965 act itself provided.

This sentence incorrectly attributes a religion-discrimination prohibition to the Immigration and Nationality Act.

The relevant INA nondiscrimination provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A), says no person shall be discriminated against in immigrant-visa issuance because of the person’s race, sex, nationality, place of birth, or place of residence. It does not include religion in that statutory list.

And when the Ninth Circuit discussed § 1152(a)(1)(A) in the travel-ban litigation, it described the statute as prohibiting nationality-based discrimination in the issuance of immigrant visas. Religion-based objections to the order were litigated under constitutional theories such as the Establishment Clause, not because the INA itself expressly bans religious discrimination in visa issuance.

The article conflates two different stages of the travel-ban litigation.

The "bona fide relationship" limitation came from the Supreme Court’s June 26, 2017 order concerning the second travel-ban version and from lower-court injunctions that were later narrowed to cover people with bona fide U.S. relationships.

But for the third version of the ban, the Supreme Court’s December 4, 2017 order in Trump v. Hawaii granted the government’s stay application and stayed the district court’s preliminary injunction pending appeal. The Supreme Court docket entry does not preserve a general bona-fide-relationship exception. And filings in the case describe the injunction the government sought to stay as one that had already been limited to people with bona fide U.S. relationships — meaning that when the Court granted the stay, it removed that protection rather than preserving it.

So it is inaccurate to describe the December 2017 version as the full ban 'which excludes' people who have bona fide U.S. relationships. The opposite is closer to what happened: the Court allowed the proclamation to take effect despite that lower-court limitation.

This sentence misstates the quota formula used by the 1921 law.

The Emergency Quota Act of 1921 did not cap immigration at a generic "1910 level." Instead, it imposed nationality-based quotas: annual admissions from a given country were limited to 3 percent of the number of foreign-born persons of that nationality residing in the United States according to the 1910 census.

That distinction matters because the law was not just pegging overall immigration to one year’s total. It was creating a quota system tied to each nationality’s 1910 U.S. census presence.

This sentence conflates passage by Congress with becoming law.

According to Congress.gov’s bill history for H.R. 2580, the measure:

• was introduced in the House on January 13, 1965;
• passed the House on August 25, 1965;
• passed the Senate on September 22, 1965; and
• became Public Law No. 89-236 on October 3, 1965.

So October 3, 1965 was the date President Johnson signed the bill into law, not the date Congress passed it.