en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Francoist_Spain

The article presents abortion as if it had been generally legalized in Spain during the Second Republic. The sources do not support that.

An official page from Spain’s Ministry of Equality states that “La primera ley del aborto en España” was Law 9/1985, approved on 5 July 1985. That directly contradicts the idea that abortion had already been legalized in Spain under the 1931 Republican constitution.

A recent academic article indexed by Dialnet explains the narrower historical reality: the Generalitat of Catalonia’s decree of 25 December 1936 decriminalized abortion in Catalonia, and because its implementation was limited, women at that time “had the right to abort or committed a crime, depending on the Spanish territory in which they lived.” In other words, abortion was not generally legalized across Spain by the Republic’s constitution; it was legalized only in part of Republican territory during the Civil War.

So the claim is inaccurate as written because it turns a limited, territory-specific 1936 measure into a general nationwide legalization during the Second Republic.

Morocco did not take control of all former Spanish Sahara territory in 1975.

A U.S. State Department historical document explains that on 14 April 1976 Morocco and Mauritania agreed to partition Western Sahara: Morocco acquired the northern two-thirds and Mauritania got the southern third. That alone shows Morocco did not control the whole territory in 1975.

A later State Department document from 17 October 1979 then refers to “Moroccan annexation of the portion of the Western Sahara relinquished by Mauritania.” That means Morocco only moved to absorb the Mauritanian-controlled sector in 1979, after Mauritania withdrew.

So the article’s wording is incorrect because it says Morocco took control of all the former Spanish Sahara in 1975, when in fact the territory was first split between Morocco and Mauritania and only later, in 1979, did Morocco move to annex Mauritania’s former portion.

The claim attributes the 1946 action to the Security Council and describes it as denying the Franco regime recognition. That is not what the cited UN record shows.

A source summarizing Security Council Resolution 4 (1946) says the resolution “establishes a subcommittee of five Security Council members to investigate whether the situation in Spain under the Franco regime has led to international friction and endangers international peace and security.” In other words, the Council’s action in April 1946 was to investigate the Spanish question, not to vote to withhold recognition until Spain became representative.

The later recommendation the article seems to be paraphrasing appears in UN General Assembly Resolution 39(I) of 12 December 1946. That resolution says the General Assembly “recommends that the Franco Government of Spain be debarred” from UN-linked bodies “until a new and acceptable government is formed in Spain,” and further recommends Security Council action if a government deriving authority from the consent of the governed is not established.

So the article conflates two different UN organs and actions: the Security Council investigated the issue in 1946, while the General Assembly made the recommendation about excluding Franco’s government until a new acceptable government was formed.

The sentence combines a broadly true point with a false one.

It is historically accurate that Francoism sharply restricted women’s access to legal professions, including judicial careers. But the claim that women could not testify in a trial is contradicted by research based on Francoist court records.

A peer-reviewed study on the courtroom in early Francoist Spain examines rape cases under the dictatorship and repeatedly describes how courts handled victims’ statements, witness testimony, and medical evidence in those proceedings. Its abstract explains that the article studies the Spanish court system as a site of secondary victimisation for sexual-assault victims under Francoism, and the text notes that judges exploited witness testimony in these cases. That would not be possible if women were categorically unable to testify.

So the sentence is inaccurate because it turns severe professional discrimination against women into a blanket ban on women giving testimony in court.