en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asylum_in_the_United_States

USCIS’s Form I-765 instructions for applicants with pending asylum applications state that an applicant is subject to a 150-day waiting period before they may apply for an Employment Authorization Document (EAD), plus an additional 30 days before USCIS may issue it, for a total of 180 days. USCIS also explains elsewhere that a person with a pending asylum application may seek employment authorization once the asylum application has been pending at least 150 days. That directly contradicts the article’s statement that eligibility begins only after 365 days.

A 365-day figure is associated with other rules in the immigration system, but it is not the standard waiting period USCIS gives for initial asylum-based work authorization under category (c)(8).

This passage conflates Matter of Acosta with Matter of Toboso-Alfonso.

• In Matter of Acosta (BIA 1985), the Board interpreted “particular social group” to mean a group sharing a common, immutable characteristic. The decision gives examples such as sex, color, or kinship ties, and then applies the rule to a Salvadoran taxi-driver/cooperative case. It does not say that homosexuality or LGBT status is explicitly included.
• The precedential immigration case that actually addressed homosexuality as a particular social group was Matter of Toboso-Alfonso. In that case, the Board discussed a Cuban applicant who asserted that he was persecuted because he was a homosexual, and the Board upheld relief on that basis.

So Acosta is important for the legal test, but the article is incorrect to say Acosta itself explicitly expanded the definition to include homosexuality and the LGBT population.

This overstates what Matter of A-B- did.

In the 2018 decision, Attorney General Sessions wrote that “Generally” claims involving domestic violence or gang violence by nongovernmental actors would not qualify for asylum. That is not the same as saying such applicants “will no longer qualify” across the board. The decision announced a restrictive approach, but it was not a categorical rule that all such claims were barred.

The article’s wording is also inaccurate because the decision was later vacated. In 2021, Attorney General Garland vacated the 2018 A-B- decision and described it as having held that, in general, private-violence claims would not qualify except perhaps in exceptional circumstances. So the absolute phrasing in the article is stronger than the decision itself and is legally incorrect.

This sentence misdates the BIA’s use of the ‘social visibility’ concept.

The Board’s precedential decision in Matter of C-A-, published in 2006, states that “[t]he social visibility of the members of a claimed social group is an important consideration” in identifying a particular social group. DOJ has also described the BIA as having issued the relevant precedential decisions on this point between 2006 and 2008.

So attributing that ‘social visibility’ requirement to 2002 is incorrect.