en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rationalism
1 correction found
denied the existence of a material world.
This overstates Leibniz’s view. He denied that matter is a fundamental substance, but he did not deny the existence of bodies or the material world as phenomena grounded in monads.
Full reasoning
Authoritative reference works describe Leibniz as rejecting material substance, not as denying that bodies exist at all.
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy explains that Leibniz opposed Cartesian dualism because of his "denial of the existence of genuine extended material substance". The same entry then says that, for Leibniz, bodies are aggregates of substances and "appear to us as extended corporeal phenomena," and that these are "well-founded" phenomena grounded in real beings. In other words, Leibniz treats bodies as real phenomena founded on monads, not as nonexistent.
A second SEP entry summarizes the position the same way: Leibniz held that "monads or simple substances are the only true substances and that material things are only phenomena, though well founded and well connected." That is a denial of matter as ultimate substance, not a denial that there is any material world whatsoever.
So the article’s wording is too strong: Leibniz did not simply deny the existence of a material world; he denied that matter is fundamentally substantial, while still allowing bodies/material things as derivative, well-founded phenomena.
2 sources
- Leibniz's Philosophy of Mind (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Leibniz's opposition to Cartesian dualism stems ... from his denial of the existence of genuine extended material substance... bodies just are aggregates of substances which appear to us as extended corporeal phenomena, though they are 'well-founded' phenomena.
- Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Leibniz ... came to understand ... that monads or simple substances are the only true substances and that material things are only phenomena, though well founded and well connected.