www.lesswrong.com/posts/d5Lqf8nSxm6RpmmnA/anthropic-statement-from-dario-amodei-...
1 correction found
a “supply chain risk”—a label reserved for US adversaries, never before applied to an American company—
“Supply chain risk” is not a label reserved for U.S. adversaries; in U.S. procurement law it is defined broadly to include risks posed by “any person,” not just adversary nations or their firms.
Full reasoning
The post asserts that being designated a “supply chain risk” is “a label reserved for US adversaries.” That framing is inconsistent with how “supply chain risk” is defined and used in U.S. federal procurement law.
What the law says
U.S. Code defines “supply chain risk” in general terms—not as something limited to adversary countries or adversary-controlled entities. In 41 U.S.C. § 4713, the definition explicitly covers risk that “any person” may sabotage or manipulate covered articles (IT, telecom, etc.). Because the statutory definition is not restricted to “U.S. adversaries,” the claim that the label is “reserved” for adversaries is inaccurate.
How the term is used in practice (example)
Federal supply-chain-security exclusion/removal actions have also been applied via formal orders to non-U.S. firms not inherently describable as “U.S. adversaries” by nationality alone (e.g., ODNI’s published FASCSA exclusion/removal order excluding Acronis AG, a company widely described as Swiss). This further undercuts the idea that “supply chain risk” is a label reserved only for U.S. adversaries.
Note: I’m only flagging the “reserved for US adversaries” part as incorrect, because that is directly contradicted by the statutory definition and documented government usage. I did not find definitive evidence (in this investigation) to prove or disprove the separate sub-claim that such a label has “never before [been] applied to an American company.”
3 sources
- 41 U.S. Code § 4713 — Authorities relating to mitigating supply chain risks (Cornell Legal Information Institute)
Defines “supply chain risk” as risk that “any person may sabotage, maliciously introduce unwanted function, extract data, or otherwise manipulate…” covered articles—i.e., not limited to U.S. adversaries.
- FASC Issues First FASCSA Exclusion Order: Implications for Federal Contractors and ICTS Supply Chains (Morgan Lewis)
Describes an ODNI FASCSA order excluding Acronis AG and related parties from certain federal contracts—an example of supply-chain-security exclusions being applied based on supply chain risk considerations.
- Acronis Contacts (Acronis)
Lists “Switzerland — Global Headquarters” in Schaffhausen, supporting that Acronis is headquartered in Switzerland (i.e., not a U.S. adversary country by default).