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1 correction found
This is a power reserved exclusively for firms controlled by foreign adversary interests, such as Huawei,
U.S. “supply chain risk” procurement authorities (under FASCSA/FAR) are not reserved exclusively for foreign-adversary-controlled firms; they can apply to any non-federal supplier, and the statute explicitly says actions can’t be based solely on foreign ownership.
Full reasoning
The post claims that the government’s “supply chain risk” designation power is “reserved exclusively” for firms controlled by foreign adversaries.
However, the core federal procurement authority used for supply-chain security—implemented via the Federal Acquisition Supply Chain Security Act of 2018 (FASCSA)—is written to apply broadly to any “source” (i.e., a supplier), not only foreign-adversary-controlled firms.
1) FAR’s definition of “Source” is broad (not foreign-only).
FAR Subpart 4.23 (which implements FASCSA) defines “Source” as: “a non-Federal supplier, or potential supplier, of products or services, at any tier.” This definition does not limit the authority to foreign-controlled entities.
2) The underlying statute confirms the authority is not inherently “foreign-adversary-only.”
41 U.S.C. § 4713 authorizes covered procurement actions due to “significant supply chain risk” and includes a rule of construction stating that nothing in the section authorizes action “based solely on the fact of foreign ownership” of an otherwise qualified source. That language only makes sense if the authority can apply beyond “foreign adversary controlled” firms; it’s not framed as an authority reserved exclusively for such firms.
Putting these together: while supply-chain-risk actions are often associated with foreign influence concerns (and the FAR lists “foreign control or influence” as one type of supply chain risk information), the legal/regulatory framework is not limited exclusively to foreign-adversary-controlled companies. Therefore, the quoted statement is incorrect.
2 sources
- Acquisition.GOV — FAR Subpart 4.23 Federal Acquisition Security Council
Defines “Source” as “a non-Federal supplier, or potential supplier, of products or services, at any tier,” and describes supply chain risk information as including (but not limited to) foreign control or influence.
- Cornell LII — 41 U.S. Code § 4713 (Authorities relating to mitigating supply chain risks…)
Authorizes covered procurement actions for supply chain risk; includes a rule of construction: “Nothing in this section shall be construed to authorize… based solely on the fact of foreign ownership of a potential procurement source…”.