en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_Patriot_Act
6 corrections found
The Act does not apply to U.S. citizens, but is limited to dealings with foreign powers and nationals.
This is incorrect about FISA. Official DOJ and FISC materials state that FISA can apply to U.S. persons, including U.S. citizens, subject to additional or heightened requirements.
Full reasoning
The surrounding paragraph is describing the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). Official U.S. government sources explicitly say FISA can be used against U.S. persons, including U.S. citizens.
The Department of Justice's Bureau of Justice Assistance explains that for FISA electronic surveillance, "For targets that are U.S. persons (U.S. citizens, permanent resident aliens, and U.S. corporations), FISA requires heightened requirements in some instances." The same page also notes that "agents of foreign powers" may include U.S. citizens and permanent residents suspected of espionage or similar conduct.
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court likewise says FISA covers applications "directed at U.S. persons" and specifically lists applications under Section 704 "to target U.S. persons who are outside of the United States." So FISA is not limited only to foreign powers and foreign nationals.
2 sources
- The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) | Bureau of Justice Assistance
For targets that are U.S. persons (U.S. citizens, permanent resident aliens, and U.S. corporations), FISA requires heightened requirements in some instances. ... Note that "agents of foreign powers" may include U.S. citizens and permanent residents suspected of being engaged in espionage and violating U.S. law.
- About the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court | Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court | United States
The FISC's primary role is to review executive branch applications ... principally when they are conducted in the United States or directed at U.S. persons. ... Applications under Section 704 of FISA ... to target U.S. persons who are outside of the United States.
The House responded on September 11 that they unanimously disagreed with the Senate amendment, and agreed to a conference.
The date is wrong. The official congressional report states that the House disagreed to the Senate amendment to H.R. 3199 and agreed to a conference on November 9, 2005, not September 11.
Full reasoning
The reauthorization discussion here is about H.R. 3199 in 2005. An official congressional conference report on H.R. 3199 states: "On November 9, 2005, the House disagreed to the Senate amendment to H.R. 3199, and agreed to a Conference with the Senate thereon." That directly contradicts the article's claim that the House did so on September 11.
1 source
- Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 3199 (H. Rept. 109-741)
On November 9, 2005, the House disagreed to the Senate amendment to H.R. 3199, and agreed to a Conference with the Senate thereon.
Finally, on March 8, President Bush signed the reauthorization Act
The signing date is off by one day. Official records show President Bush signed H.R. 3199 on March 9, 2006, not March 8.
Full reasoning
Both the White House and the enrolled public law record date the signing on March 9, 2006. President Bush's statement says, "Today, I have signed into law H.R. 3199" and is dated March 9, 2006. The official public law is likewise labeled "PUBLIC LAW 109–177—MAR. 9, 2006." March 8 was the date the bill was presented to the President, not the date he signed it.
2 sources
- President's Statement on H.R. 3199, the "USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005"
For Immediate Release ... March 9, 2006 ... Today, I have signed into law H.R. 3199, the "USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005."
- Public Law 109-177
PUBLIC LAW 109–177—MAR. 9, 2006
Another provision struck down was the so-called "sneak and peek" provisions of the Patriot Act. These were struck down after the FBI wrongfully used the provision to arrest Portland attorney Brandon Mayfield on suspicions that he had been involved in the 2004 Madrid train bombings.
This misstates the Mayfield case. DOJ’s inspector general found there were no Section 213 “sneak and peek” searches in the Mayfield investigation, and the Ninth Circuit described Mayfield’s constitutional challenge as one to FISA sections 1804 and 1823, not the Patriot Act’s delayed-notice search provision.
Full reasoning
The Mayfield case did not strike down the Patriot Act's Section 213 delayed-notice or “sneak and peek” provision.
An official DOJ Office of the Inspector General report on the Mayfield investigation says that, contrary to public speculation, Section 213 was not used: there were no “sneak and peek” searches in that investigation. The report explains that covert searches before Mayfield’s arrest were conducted under FISA, and after his arrest the searches were based on overt criminal search warrants that did not implicate the Patriot Act.
The Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Mayfield v. United States likewise describes the constitutional claim as a challenge to 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804 and 1823, i.e. FISA’s electronic-surveillance and physical-search provisions as amended by the Patriot Act. So the article incorrectly ties the Mayfield litigation to the Patriot Act’s “sneak and peek” provision.
2 sources
- DOJ OIG executive summary on the Mayfield investigation
Section 213 of the Patriot Act authorizes delayed notification of the execution of criminal search warrants, which are sometimes referred to as “sneak and peek” searches. We found that there were no such searches conducted in the Mayfield investigation. ... After his arrest, the searches were based on overt criminal search warrants and the Patriot Act was not implicated in those searches.
- Mayfield v. United States, Ninth Circuit opinion
The complaint challenged the constitutionality of 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804 and 1823, the portions of FISA, as amended by the PATRIOT Act ...
The Wiretap Statute was mainly the result of two Supreme Court cases — Katz v. United States and Berger v. New York — and from criticism by the Church Committee of the actions of COINTELPRO.
This is chronologically impossible as written. Title III was enacted in 1968, but the Senate’s Church Committee was created in 1975 and issued its final report in 1976, so its criticism could not have been a cause of the 1968 Wiretap Statute.
Full reasoning
The article is discussing Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. DOJ materials say the federal electronic surveillance statutes known as Title III were "originally enacted as Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968."
But the Senate's official history of the Church Committee says the committee's resolution passed on January 27, 1975, and its final report issued on April 29, 1976. Because the Church Committee postdates the 1968 statute by several years, its criticism of COINTELPRO could not have been part of what mainly caused Congress to enact the 1968 Wiretap Statute.
2 sources
- DOJ Criminal Resource Manual 31 — Electronic Surveillance: Statutory Authority and Legislative History
The Federal electronic surveillance statutes (commonly referred to collectively as "Title III") were originally enacted as Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.
- U.S. Senate: Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities
Resolution passed: Jan 27, 1975 ... Final report issued: Apr 29, 1976.
The ECPA also extended the prohibition of the use of pen register and/or trap and trace devices to record dialling information used in the process of transmitting wire or electronic communications without a search warrant.
This misstates the legal standard. ECPA’s pen-register rules generally require a court order, not a search warrant.
Full reasoning
Under ECPA, pen registers and trap-and-trace devices are generally authorized by court order rather than by search warrant. The statutory rule in 18 U.S.C. § 3121 says such devices may not be used without first obtaining a court order under section 3123, and DOJ’s Bureau of Justice Assistance likewise says Title III of ECPA requires government entities to obtain a court order authorizing their installation and use.
1 source
- Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA) | Bureau of Justice Assistance
Title III of the ECPA, which addresses pen register and trap and trace devices, requires government entities to obtain a court order authorizing the installation and use of a pen register ... and/or a trap and trace ...