en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wi-Fi_deauthentication_attack#cite_note-CNN2014-5
1 correction found
and the attacker only needs to know the victim's MAC address, which is available in the clear through wireless network sniffing.
This is too broad. On networks using 802.11w Protected Management Frames, spoofed deauthentication frames need cryptographic protection, so knowing a victim’s MAC address alone is not enough.
Full reasoning
The statement describes MAC-address spoofing as sufficient for a deauthentication attack. That is true for legacy Wi‑Fi deployments, but it is not true for all WPA2-era networks.
IEEE 802.11w / Protected Management Frames (PMF) was added specifically to protect deauthentication and disassociation frames from spoofing. Cisco’s official 802.11w documentation says PMF adds cryptographic protection to deauthentication/disassociation frames and that controllers ignore deauthentication frames when the client is not using PMF. That directly contradicts the idea that an attacker only needs the victim’s MAC address.
So the article’s wording is too absolute: a MAC address alone is sufficient only on networks without PMF protection. On PMF-enabled networks, spoofed deauthentication frames are designed to be rejected unless they carry the required cryptographic protection.
2 sources
- Cisco Catalyst 9800 Series Wireless Controller Software Configuration Guide, Cisco IOS XE 17.14.x - 802.11w
Cisco: “Client protection is added by the AP adding cryptographic protection to de-authentication and dissociation frames preventing them from being spoofed in a DOS attack.”
- Configure 802.11w Management Frame Protection on WLC - Cisco
Cisco: the frame types protected include “Disassociation, Deauthentication,” and Cisco notes that controllers ignore deauthentication frames when clients are not using 802.11w PMF.