en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Post-quantum_cryptography

This sentence mixes up two different categories of cryptographic primitive. Rainbow is a signature scheme, not an encryption scheme. So citing “the Rainbow signature” as an example of a broken multivariate equation encryption scheme is incorrect. NIST describes Rainbow as “a roughly 15 year old digital signature scheme based on multivariate systems of equations.”

The table gives 154 B as the public-key size for Streamlined NTRU Prime. Open Quantum Safe’s algorithm page for NTRU-Prime lists the supported parameter set sntrup761 with a public key size of 1158 bytes and a secret key size of 1763 bytes. That directly contradicts the 154-byte figure in the article.

This sentence is incorrect in two ways.

1. The list is not just “key exchange algorithms.” Open Quantum Safe’s current algorithms page separates Key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs) from Signature schemes. On that page, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, and Falcon are listed under signature schemes, not under KEMs/key exchange.

2. Several listed algorithms were not supported in March 2023. liboqs release notes show that ML-DSA (FIPS 204 final) was added in version 0.12.0, released December 9, 2024, and SLH-DSA was integrated in version 0.15.0, released November 14, 2025. So a sentence claiming that, as of March 2023, the following algorithms were supported is factually outdated/wrong for the list that follows.

The claim says the 2019 IBM Q work could factor 15 and 21 but not 35. That is contradicted by the IBM Research publication itself, whose abstract says it studied Shor’s algorithm on IBM hardware for N = 15, 21, and 35. A later Scientific Reports paper discussing prior IBM results is even more explicit, stating that the iterative scheme was demonstrated for factoring 15, 21 and 35 on an IBM quantum processor. So the article’s exclusion of 35 is incorrect.