en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fourteenth_Amendment_to_the_United_States_Constitution

This sentence conflates two different parts of Section 2.

Section 2 first sets the apportionment rule for House seats: representatives are apportioned by "the whole number of persons in each State" (with the obsolete exception for "Indians not taxed"). It then adds a separate penalty formula reducing a state's representation if it denies the vote to certain male citizens aged 21 or older.

So the amendment did not switch apportionment to each state's adult male population. Adult male citizens were relevant only to the reduction formula for voter disenfranchisement, not to the base population used for apportionment or electoral votes.

This overstates the Court's holding.

In Trump v. Anderson, the Court drew a federal/state distinction:

• States may enforce Section 3 for state office.
• States may not enforce Section 3 against federal officeholders and candidates.
• For federal offices, the Court said the Amendment's text "speak[s] only to enforcement by Congress" through Section 5.

The opinion expressly states: "States may disqualify persons holding or attempting to hold state office. But States have no power under the Constitution to enforce Section 3 with respect to federal offices, especially the Presidency."

So it is incorrect to say the Court delegated enforcement to Congress "for federal and state officers." The Court left room for state enforcement as to state offices.

This misstates the reasoning of Elk v. Wilkins.

The Court did not hold that Indian reservations were outside federal jurisdiction. In fact, the Court described tribal members as living within the territorial limits of the United States and explained that the relevant issue was political allegiance and jurisdiction, not geographic location outside federal control.

The opinion says members of tribes "owed immediate allegiance to their several tribes" and that the Citizenship Clause requires being "completely subject to [the United States'] political jurisdiction, and owing them direct and immediate allegiance." It then explains that tribal members born in the United States were not citizens at birth for that reason.

So the article reverses the case's logic: the Court's point was not that reservations were beyond federal jurisdiction, but that tribal members were not, at birth, fully within U.S. political jurisdiction in the constitutional sense the Court adopted.

This sentence states Justice Powell's individual view as though it were the holding of the entire Court in Bakke.

As the Supreme Court later explained in Grutter v. Bollinger, Bakke produced six separate opinions, none of which commanded a majority. Grutter specifically notes that "[i]n a part of his opinion that was joined by no other Justice, Justice Powell expressed his view" that attaining a diverse student body was the only interest that survived scrutiny.

Grutter then says the Court itself was endorsing Justice Powell's view in 2003. That means the diversity-as-compelling-interest rationale was not a majority holding of the Court in Bakke itself.

It is accurate that Bakke struck down the quota system and that Powell endorsed diversity as a compelling interest, but it is inaccurate to say "The Supreme Court ruled" that point in Bakke as a majority holding.

This sentence attributes the core holding of the Gold Clause Cases to the Emergency Banking Act of 1933, but the cases themselves identify a different measure as the relevant one: the Joint Resolution of June 5, 1933.

In Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., the Court said the cases presented "the question of the validity of the Joint Resolution of the Congress, of June 5, 1933, with respect to the 'gold clauses' of private contracts". In Perry v. United States, the Court likewise described the plaintiff's claim as challenging refusals "based on the Joint Resolution of the Congress of June 5, 1933" and then stated that the question presented was whether that Joint Resolution was valid as applied to U.S. obligations.

The Emergency Banking Act appears in the background as one of several related currency measures, but the judicial issue about invalidating gold clauses was tied to the June 5, 1933 Joint Resolution, not to the Emergency Banking Act itself.